English
讲座编号：jz-yjsb-2018-y001
讲座题目：公司管治披露政策的经济结果
主 讲 人：路海昊 加拿大滑铁卢大学会计与金融学院副教授
讲座时间：2018年03月30日（周五）上午09：30
讲座所在：阜成路西校区综合楼501室
加入工具：商学院会计系与财务系教师与研究生，全校对该专题感兴趣的师生
主办单位：研究生院
承办单位：商学院
主讲人简介：
加拿大滑铁卢大学会计与金融学院副教授，结业于加拿大多伦多大学 (University of Toronto)会计学博士, 师从知名会计学家Ole-Kristian Hope。研究兴趣包括资本市场，银行信贷，信用评级，公司治理，关联交易等实证研究。曾在Journal of Business Finance and Accounting期刊宣布学术论文，并担当Accounting Horizon、Journal of Corporate Finance和Contemporary Accounting Research期刊匿名审稿人。
主讲内容：
This paper examines the economic consequences of a 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation mandating public firms to disclose their governance policies on related-party transactions (hereafter RPTs). Employing hand-collected RPT data for S&P 1500 firms, I find that the initiation of RPT governance disclosure significantly reduces the occurrence of RPTs, suggesting an improvement in RPT governance. This reduction is more pronounced for firms with lower analyst coverage, weaker product-market competition, and lower institutional ownership. I also find that the disclosure effect is conditional on the types of RPTs and on the identities of the parties involved. Specifically, the disclosure effect concentrates on RPTs with the CEO, with the chairman of the board, and with directors, and on RPTs involving sales, leases, or loans, suggesting these transactions are more likely used for expropriation. Finally, I find that the disclosure of RPT governance reduces the implied costs of capital (ICC) associated with RPTs. I examine two possible mechanisms reducing the costs of capital and find that the governance channel is the main contributing factor over the information channel. My inferences are robust to the use of either the volume or amount of RPTs. Taken together, this study provides evidence about how disclosure on governance can enhance firms’ governance and about the real effects of the 2006 SEC’s regulation.
